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Though a city or other municipal corporation has the fee of the soil in the street,
yet it holds is a trustee for the public, and cannot authorize the use of the street fbi
private pwposs, or for publi purposes which will make it dangerous for ordinary
trav.L
Such corporation, therefore, has no authority, without express legislative sanction,
to license the use of steam-motors upon its streets, either by street railway companies
or by individuals.
Such uauthorizd Dise is negligence in the city, which will make it liable fai
injuries received by travellers on the street in consequence of the use of the motors.

This was an action to
recover for injuries alleged to have been received by plaintiff while
driving a horse harnessed to a wagon along a street in the city, by
reason of the horse taking fright at a steam-motor on said street,
under the authority and permission of the defendant.
There were two counts in the petition. To the first there was a
demurrer, which was sustained, and to which the plaintiff excepted.
And refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered against her.
It was stipulated by counsel when the demurrer was submitted,
that it presented for determination the following question: "Whether
or not it was negligence on the part of the defendant to permit the
use of a steam-motor on Brady street under the written authority
set out in said petition, and allowing it to remain and be used
thereon." The written authority referred to was a resolution of
the city council granting permission to use the motor on Brady
street for thirty days.
The second count, which set out a cause of action based on the
use of a motor, was substantially as the same was stated in the first
count. There were also other acts of negligence alleged in the
second count, because of which the plaintiff claimed to recover.
The defendant filed a motion to strike out of the second count all
the allegatious relating to the motor. The motion was sustained and
plaintiff excepted.
APPBAL from Scott county Circuit Court.

A. J. iir 'hl, for appellant.
fi. H. Mfartin, for appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-[After disposing of a question on the technical
effects of the appeal, not of general interest.] In 1870 the defendant granted to ".The Davenport Ceitral Railroad Company the
exclusive right to lay and operate, upon * * Brady * * street, in
said city, a single horse-railway, with the necessary side tracks."
The right of the city to make this grant is not questioned. In
1878 the city granted "J. M. Davies permission -to ran one of
Baldwin's noiseless steam-motors on Brady street, on probation for
thirty days." The motor was run and operated on the track of
the street railway company.
It has been held that cities have the authority to grant railroad
companies who use steam in operating their roads the right to
occupy with their track a street or streets of the city: I Millburn v.
Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246, and numerous other cases. These
decisions were based on a statute providing "that any (railway) corporation may raise or lower any turnpike, plank-road or other highway for the purpose of having its railway pass over or under the
same, and in such cases said corporation shall put such highway as
soon as may be in as good repair and condition as before such alteration." Code, see. 1262.
In the Millburn Case the words "pass over" were construed to
mean "upon" or lengthwise, and this construction has been several
times followed in subsequent cases. As thus construed, the legislative assent had been given to the laying down of railway tracks
in streets, and the operation of the same by the use of steam, subject, however, to proper equitable control and police regulations:
O7icago, c., Railroad Co. v. Mayor of Newton, 36 Iowa 299.
But it never has been held that cities had the authority to grant
such privileges in the absence of a legislative grant to that effect,
whatever may have been said by judges who have written opinions
in the cases in which this question has been determined or discussed. It is quite apparent, we think, that all the .cases subsequent thereto are based on the Millburn Case, which, as we understand it, is based on the statute. It is worthy of note that, notwithstanding the several decisions following the Millburn Case, it
has not been deemed satisfactory to the profession or general public. This is apparent from the numerous cases in which the doc-trine of the Millburn Case has been vigorously assaulted by counsel.
Finally, in 1874, the General Assembly enacted a substitute for
SEEVERS,
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Code.sec. 1262, which provides that railway corporations may "cross
over or under" any highway with its railway: Chap.47, Law 15, General Assembly. To cross over or under does not mean upon or lengthwise. Under the circumstances, the legislative intent has been clearly
expraed, and it is .to ,the effect that railways operated by steam
,can pa be woitructed, upon streets and highways except as provided;in &.eotionof the code hereiaafter referred to. Or if this be
not truethalegislative assent.contained.in sect. 1262 of the code has
-benwithdrawn by the enactment 'of the statute of 1874. We are
not called- on.to vindicate or condemn the wisdom of this statute.
To construe..gr ascertain its meaning is our only province. The
various deoisions, above referred to are not now correct expositions
of the law, because they have been superseded by that branch of
the 'government whose province it-is to enact, but not to construe
the law.
.Theremaining .question is whether the city had the authority, in
.the absence of a grant from the General Assembly, to authorize or
.permit the use.of the steam motor on Brady street in said city. If
AswA power d. not exist,.the~pemnission could.well be styled negli.genoe,fec which, th. city should be held responsible. Unless the
city au shield itself by reason of its authority in the-premises, the
.permissioa to.use the motor on the street constitutes negligence.
, Tat.it was an experimeut is not material If no power existed,
'it m*ttm .notwhether the authorized use was for a long or short
.period of time. The defendant was organized under a special
charter,. and itis sipulated by counsel that neither the charter nor
ordinances of the city expressly prohibit the street railway company
"from using other thaj..nimal power in operating its road." Nor
.doe#,. the ebarter nor ordinances contain a grant to that effect.
Therefore wethink it must be true that the street railway company
had 9.righkt0 use or autlorize the use of steam on its track. Hence
the Vpplication to the city oouncil, and-the necessity that it should
.grant the requisite permission.
Thq,,chrtr epowers the defendant to "open, alter, abolish,
,wideq, exkndestablish, grade, pave or otherwise improve and keep
*yefair,#preqtu, xvenues4nd alleys." That the requisite power is
,pocott~iued.iu, the chaer we regard as beyond serious controvruy. .Wefeel thle more certain of this because the learned counpel fr the.eity does not claim such authority is contained therein.
Jt:may be that cities organized under the general incorporation law
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have such authority. If so, it is because there is a statute to that
effect: Code, sect. 464. Such statute, however, is not applicable to
the defendant.
The fee of the streets is in the city, and yet it is held in trust for
the use and benefit of the public. The city does not have the
authority to sell and convey the title held by it or authorize the
streets to be used for private purposes. Nor can it, without legislative authority, grant the use of a street for a public purpose, which
renders it dangerous for the public to travel over it in any other
manner. The public partakes of that eminent domain which, under
our government, can only be granted by the law-making power of
the state. Streets and highways are under the exclusive control of
the General Assembly. It matters not if the fee of the streets is
in the city, it has no authority to control or grant rights and privileges thereto or thereon, unless it has been so authorized. The
power and authority of the city is contained in its charter and
bounded thereby. It has no other or different control of the streets
than is prescribed in the charter or the general statutes of the state.
A distinction has been drawn between a railway operated by horse
and steam power, and whether the defendant may authorize the former and not the latter, is not in this case, and we only allude
thereto lest we be misunderstood. The strong current of the
authorities, as we understand, are in accord with the views herein
expressed : 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 567, 568 ; Davis v. Mayor, &e., 14
N. Y. 506; AHilkau v. Sha7 , 27 Id. 611; Coin v. Brie Railroad Co., 27 Penn. St. 344; Protzman v. Illinois Cent. Railroad
Co., 9 Ind. 468 ; Sate v. Inhabitantsof Trenton, 36 N.. J. L. 83;
Memphis City Railway Co. v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 406.
It is suggested, but not pressed, in argument, that the act of the
city council being without authority, the city is not responsible for
any consequence resulting therefrom. The city had jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, that is, of the streets, and could only act in relation thereto through its council. The latter had control of the
streets of the city, but were mistaken as to the extent of their
authority. The particular thing the council authorized to be done
was illegal, and we think the city is responsible for the consequences
resulting therefrom. The modern doctrine we understand to be
this: Whenever an action for an injury to the property or person.
of another will lie against an individual, corporations will, in like
circumstances, be equally liable for any injuries committed by their
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officers and agents acting within the apparent scope of their author.
ity. It was therefore held in Lee v. The Vilage of Sandy Hill,
40 N. Y. 443, that the defendant was liable for a trespass committed under the direction of the village trustees. The trespass consisted in removing a fence which they erroneously supposed encroached upon the street.
In City of Pekin v. NYewell, 26 Ill. 320, the city was authorized
"to build and construct an embankment and plank-road across the
Illinois river bottom opposite said city." Instead of so doing, a
pile bridge was constructed in such a negligent manner that the
horse of the defendant in error fell through the bridge and was
killed. The city sought to defend on the ground that the bridge
was built without authority. But it was rightly, we think, held
otherwise. Other authorities might be cited to the same effect.
Reversed.
ADAMS, J.; dissenting.-Decisions in relation to the occupancy
of t-eets by ordinary railroads not designed for street purposes, are,
in my judgment, not strictly applicable to this case. A street railway, whether operated by animal, steam or other power, is not an
obstruction to the same extent. It is consistent with all the legitimate uses to which a street is put, and has come to be deemed a
public necessity.
In my opinion, the city council may regulate the use of streets
without any special grant of power in this respect, and may, in its
discretion, with a view of promoting its public interest, allow cars
to be drawn thereon for street purposes, either by animal, steam,
atmospheric pressure or other power, and that, too, though the cars
or motors may be such as to cause fright, to some extent, to timid
horses. It must, I think, be allowed in such a case, to judge of the
objectionableness, if any, of proposed cars or motors, and whether
the inconvenience, if any, resulting to any persons, as causing
fright to horses, would be such as to overcome the considerations of
public necessity or advantage. Steam fire-engines are well calcu
lated to frighten timid horses, yet no one supposes that a city council could not permit them to be drawn upon a street. Many other
things may be done on the streets which are calculat6i to frighten
timid horses, but they are not necessarily to be forbid .en for that
reason. Private convenience must' sometimes yieli to whai is
deemed a paramount public convenience.
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When the city council of defendant city granted permission tu
use a motor upon one of its street railways, we must presume that
it did so because it considered that the public convenience demanded
it; and the. defendant city should not, in my judgment, be held lia&e for the injury resulting from the fright of plaintiff's horse.
Whether a city council, without express authority from the legislature, can grant an exclusive right to operate a street railroad by
the use of a motor or otherwise, or what right it can grant, if any,
are entirely different questions. Upon them, I think, the decisions
have not been entirely uniform. If the city council can grant
no right, then an attempt to do so would be void; and the ground
of the plaintiff's complaint would be simply that the city suffered
the motor to be used, but such suffrance would not, in my judgment,
be negligence, because I think that a city council may exercise a
discretion in relation to what it shall suffer and what it shall forbid,
so long as it acts in good faith, and with a view to promoting the
public convenience. I see no error in the ruling of the Circuit
Court.
Judgment reversed.
The powers and liabilities of municipal corporations, in respect to public
streets, have given rise to various and
interesting questions. Two of the most
important of these we propose to consider
in connection with the principal case, being involved therein. The first of these
questions may be stated to be, whether
a municipalitycan lawfully grant the use
of its streets for railway purposes. The
second question is, whether a municipality is liable in a private action to an individual injured in consequence of its neglect
to perform a public duty.
I. That the legislature, under the right
of eminent domain, can authorize a railway to occupy any public street for railway purposes, subject to the following
limitations, is no where questioned.
1. In those cases in which the fee of
the street remains in the owner of abutting
lots, the street may be used, under legislative authority, by a railroad operated
by steam, only after compensation has
been made to the owners of the fee: Wager v. Troy, 4-c., Railroad Co., 25 N.
Y. 526 ; Kucheman v. C. C., 6-c., Rail-

road Co., 46 Iowa 366; Hanchman V.
Patterson, 4-c., Railroad Co., 17 N. J.
Eq. 75; Harrington v
. Paul, 4c.,
Railroad Co., 17 Minn 215.
2. The weight of au*ority seems to
be, that where the fee rawdns as before
in the owners of abuttinz I,.ta, the legislature may authorize the usw f the street
by a horse-railway with6ut ,uv compensation to abutting owners: ELik, v. Fair
Hauen, d-c., RailroadCo., 32 CtI,. 586;
Cincinnati ,Street Railuway Co. V CuM.minville, 14 Ohio St. 513; J0erze, C'.Oy,
i*c., Railroad Co. v. Jersey Citkr g..,
20 N.J. Eq. 61 ; Peddicordv.Balt,.e.,
ic., Passenger Railroad Co., 34 Md.
464; Hi(nchman v. Railroad Co., 17 X.
J. 75. It is, however, to be noticed that
in New York it is held that compensation
is as necessary in thosecues in which the
street is used by a horse-railway, as when
used byasteam-railway : Craigv. Rockester City, 4-c., Railroad Co., 39 N. Y.
404.
3. It is believed that no case has yet
been presented to the higher courts which
involved the right of an-abut#ng owner
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to compensation, where the street railway
was operated by means of a steam-motor,
such as is described in the principal case.
Whether any distinction will be made
between the regular steasmrailway and
and what is known as the Baldwin-motor remains to be seen. Such a case is
now pending in one of the inferior courta
of Aimienw0 and may posaiblyreach the
Suprme Court of that state.
4. IL those cases in which the fee is
vested juthe pu liq, it is settled that the
legislatur may permit the use of the street
even bya, sem-railway without compensation to the owners of adjoining lots:
Ia tMe matter of the Philadelphia, 4.a.,
Railroad Co., 6 Whart. 25 ; Millburn y.
Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246, 261 ; Darenpon v. Sevenson, 34 Id. 225; Moses
v. The Railroad Co., 21 Ill. 522; Atchison, J-c., Railroad Co. v. Garaide, 10
Kams. 552.
5. Where the fee isowned or held by
the municipality, it is not necessary to
make cempenmtioa to much municipality
for the-use of the street, when used by a
steam or horse-railway.:- Savannah, Jc.,
Rairoad Co. , The Mayor, 45 Ga. 602 ;
Cily of Clinton v. CedarRapids, 24 Iowa
455.
6. In thoae cases in which the owner
of abutting lots has merely an easement
in the street, the fee being held by the
public, compensation must be made to
such owner, provided the appropriation
of the street for railway purposes deprives him of his reasonable use of the
street, or of his access to and from his
lot: Larington, 4-c., Railroad Co. v.
Appsege, 8 Dana 289; Elizabethtown,
J-c., Railroad Co. v. Com6s, 10 Bush
382 ; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St.
459;..Haymes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38;
Cadle v. Mvusctixe, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
44 Iowa 11 ; Anderson T. Turbeville,
6 Coldw. 150, 158.
We come now to consider one of the
questions presented in the particular
ease, the right of a municipality to auVOL. XXVII.-3

thorize a street within its limits to be
used for railway purposes.
It seems to be settled that in Great
Britain, legislative authority is necessary
to enable a municipality or others to occupy the streets for railway purposes:
Galbreath v. Armour, 4 Bell App. Cas.
374; Queen v. Gas Company,2 E. & E.
651 ; Q e v. Clharlesworth, 16 Q. B.
1012; Reqia v. Train, 9 Cox. Cr.
Cas. 180. And such undoubtedly is the
law in this country: 2 Dill. Mun. Corp.
1568. But it is usual for the legislature
to grant to municipal corporations, being
a part of the governmental machinery
of the state, extensive powers in respect
to streets and public ways and the uses
to which they may be appropriated.
Whether the powe-s so granted include
the authority to consent to the use of a
city street by an authorized or incorporated railwaycompany, must of course b
one of construction, when the authority
is not conferred in express and specific
terms. In the particular case, it appears from the decision therein, that the
charter of the city of Davenport empowered that municipality, "to open,
alter, abolish, widen, extend, establish,
grade, pave, or otherwise improve and
keep in repair, streets, avenues and alleys."
There is no mention of any
more general authority than this as having been conferred upon the city. And
in construing this provision, the court
decides, that it is not broad enough to
authorize the use of the street in the
manner attempted. The language of the
court is, "That the requisite power is
not contained in the charter, we regard
as beyond serious controversy."
In
Indiana, where the general act for the
incorporation of cities provided, that
"the common council shall have exclusive power over the streets, highways,
alleys and bridges within such city, and
to lay out, survey, open, straighten, widen or otherwise alter the same, to make
repairs thereto and to construct and es-

STANLEY v. CITY OF DAVENPORT.
tablish sidewalks, crossings, drains, &c,"
the court said, in Indtanapoliv, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. The State, 37 Ind. 489, 494,
" We are of the opinion, that the common council of a city have no authority
to make contracts for the sale or letting
of any public street or any portion.
They may, it is true, grant an easement
in the street to a railroad company, to use
the street in common with the public; but
they could not make a grant authorizing
a railroad company to obstruct or to appropriate to her sole use any public
street." And it was further said, that
"Over the public highways without the
limits of a city, the legislature have retained their authority, but over those
within the limits of a city, they have
delegated their authority to the common
council of the city, and their acts in relation thereto, will be of the same force
and "fect as the acts of the legislature
in relation to the public highways without."

In Louisiana, where the charter of New
Orleans gave to the city the power "to
regulate and improve streets," and to
"regulate carts, &c., and vehicles of
every description, thereon," and a state
or general law in relation to public improvements, provided that "no railroad,
olank-read or canal should be constructed
through the streets of any incorporated
city or town without the consent of the
municipal council thereof," it was held
competent, in Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La.
Ann. 842 (1859), for the city to grant
the right of way in tha streets to a company organized for the purpose of laying
down rails and running horse-cars over
them. In the course of the decision it is
said "no citizen has a legal right to complain that the streets are used by other
citizens in a peculiar manner, even if it
-auses him a little inconvenience, so long
as lie himself is allowed the free use of
the streets in his peculiar mode. The
streets are destined for public use, but
not a particularmode of public use. If
the city of New Orleans wished to expend

the money necessary for the laying of
rails throughout the city, for the purpose
of permitting all who wished to run their
own cars thereupon, drawn by horses or
mules, no one could complain, so long as
it did not prevent other modes of traversing the streets; for travelling in cars on
rails is one mode of using public streets,
and there is no reason in the nature of
things why it should be lawful to travel
in a carriage or gig upon the streets, and
not lawful to travel in a car upon rails
fixed in the streets, but not so laid as to
prevent the use of the streets by other
modes of conveyance."
In New York, the charter of the city
of New York, gave that municipality
"full power, license and authority to establish, appoint, order and direct the
establishing, making, laying out, ordering, amending and repairing of all streets,
lanes, alloys, highways, &c., in and
throughout the city, necessary, needful
and convenient for the inhabitants of said
city, and for all travellers and passengers
there." The court there said, in Drake
v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 7 Barb.
547, that "the reulaion of the streets
we understand to be vested in the common council of the city, and that the manner and mode of using the same for the
purpose and conformably to the trusts of
the same, is to be prescribed and directed
by them. That power, rightly exercised
while it keeps the streets open to the use
of all carriages and vehicles accustomed
to use them, will allow any new species
of carriage or vehicle, or improved mode
of conveyance of greater convenience and
speed to participate in the use of the same,
and the street, or a suitable portion of it,
to be adapted, as far as the legitimate
purposes thereof as a street will permit,
to such new mode of using it." And in
Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 206, it was
held that the common council of the city
had the right to grant the use of the streets
to a railroad- company. This case was
reversed in 17 Barb. 435, but upon the
ground that the anthority given by the
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eouncil to the company was in the nature upon which those two judges differed.
of an irrevocablegrant and not a revoca- The question next came before the Court
ble license, and that the city had no right of Appeals in Milhau v. Sarp, 27 N. Y.
618, and this case is cited in the printo grant away or abrogate its control of
be conthe streets to a private corporation. The cipal case. It cannot, however,
of that
favor
in
an
authority
as
sidered
court, in announcing its decision, said:
"It was asserted by the defendant's oun- case, inasmuch as the question involved
or
se. upon the trial, that the authority to in the principal case was not raised
construct a railroad, conferred upon the decided by the court. On the contrary,
defendants by this resolution (granting SEr.zw, J., in giving the decision of the
the right of way), may at any time be court, took particular pains to state that
recalled. If this were so-if the fsolu- "It is not necessary now to decide the
the judges
tion could be regarded as a mere revo- question, about which two of
fayor, 14 N.
v.
The
(Davis
case
in
that
case
the
relieve
would
cable license--it
involving
from a fatal difficulty ; for I am not pre- Y. 506,) differed in opinion,
pared to say that, in the exercise of the the power of the common council, or of
discretionary power with which the cor- .the corporation of New York, in any
manner or under any circumstances to
poration is endowed in the management
and use of railand regulation of streets, it may not au- authorize the construction
This
thorize an individual or association to lay ways in the streets of that city.
of
power
the
general
not
involves,
case
down a railroad track even in Broadway.
But this resolution goes farther ; it au- the corporation over the streets, but only
thorizes the associates to construct the the question whether the common council
priroad, and reserves no right to rescind the had authority to grant the particular
The
claim."
defendants
the
which
vilege
afterwards
grant." The same question
came before the New York Court of Ap- grant being open to the objections raised
peals, in Davis v. The Mayor, 14 N. Y. in the preceding New York cases, the rl506, and it was held that the particular ing was the same as before.
The court in its opinion in the princiauthority sought to be conferred by the
36
city was ultra vires. Mr. Justice Coxs- pal case, also cite State v. Trenton,
STOCK, in his concurring opinion, holding N. J. L. 83. But in this case, the cpurt
the questhe authority invalid under the circum- expressly disclaimed deciding
case, sayprincipal
the
in
involved
tion
pains,
took
case,
particular
of
that
stances
to consider
however, to distinctly state, that he was ing, "it will not be necessary
"confidently of opinion that the muni- whether in this state, a municipal corpothe power to regulate
cipal government of New York may con- ration may, under
struct, or by mere license authorize others streets, grant authority without the conto construct, an iron track in Broadway, currence of express legislation, to lay and
adapted to vehicles of the kind used upon maintain a horse-railway in the public
railroads, and that licenses may be granted streets." What the court actually deto the owners of such vehicles, as other cided was, that the council could not
carriages are now licensed." Dmqio, grant to an individual a license to lay a
C. J., in effect denied the validity of the railroad track across a public street for
authority either as a license or grant. his own private and personal use. We
Two other judges held the authority valid doubt if any one will question the corwithout expressing an opinion as to whe- rectness of such a conclusion. But in
ther it amounted to a license. The other Morris, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Newark,
10 N. J. Eq. 352, it was held that a
judges held the authority void, agreeing
therein with both COMSTOCK and D] ixo, railroad company could not occupy the
but expr ssing no opinion on the point streets of Newark, without first obtain-
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Ing the consent of the common council cage, 29 Ills. 286, it is said to
be ,tbe
of that city, thereby seemingly implying settled law of this court, as well main
that a municipal corporation has author- most of
the other states of this union,
ity to license a railroad company to use that it is a legitimate use of
a street ox
its streets for railwaypurposes. Seealso
highway, to allow a railroad track to be
Stone v. Fairbury, 4-c., Railroad Co., laid
down in it." Chief Justice CooLar,
68 [11. 394 ; RailroadCo. v. Baltimore,
in Constitutional Limitations, 2d ed.
21 Md. 93; City Railway Co. v. Louis- 556, says, "When land is taken
or dediville, 4 Bush 478; Atcdison, 4-c., Railcated for a town street, it is unquestionroad Co. v. Garside, 10 Kans. 552 ; ably appropriated for all the ordinary
Lexington, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Apple- purposes of a town street.
Not merely
gate., 8 Dana 289; Wolf v. C. J-L.
the purposes to which such streeta were
Railroad Co., 15 B. Mon. 404 ; Perry formerly
applied, but those demanded by
Y. New Orleans, 6-c., Railroad Co., 55 new improvements and new
wants.
Ala. 513. Were it not for the construc- Among these purposes
is the use for cartion which the Supreme Court of Iowa riages which run upon a grooved track ;
has now placed upon the cases of All'- and the preparation of important streets
burn v. Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246, in large cities for their use is not only a
and City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, frequent necessity, which must be supJ-c., Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 456, and posed to have been contemplated, but
other cases in the same court, we should is almost as much a matter of course as
have regarded it as settled beyond con- the gradhtg and paving." We cannot
troversy that in Iowa, a municipality had suppose that at this late day, any court
authority to grant the use of its streets will deny that under tie authority to
for railway purposes.
"improve" streets is included the right
An examination of the authorities to grade and pave. It follows as a matseems to us to show:
ter of course from the power conferred.
1. That a municipality cannot grant Is it not then "almost as much a matter
the use of its streets to a railway com- of course" that a city has the right to
pany in such a manner as to abrogate its improve the street by making provision
powers and duties over and concerning for more rapid transit by means of
carthe public streets.
riages propelled along grooved tracks I
2. That it may license a railway com- The courts have decided again and
again
pany to use the streets subject to its su- that such use of a highway is only an impervision and control.
proved mode of using the same. In Moses
If, however, there be any doubt upon v. Pittsburgh, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 21 Ill.
the atthorities as to this last proposition, 522, it is very
emphatically said that,
ought there to be upon principle ? If it "A street is made for the passage of perbe conceded that a city has a right to sons and property
; and the law cannot
regulate the use of its streets and that
define what exclusive means of transportheir use by railways is a legitimate use, tation and passage shall be used. Unithen it seeins to follow necessarily that a
versa experience shows that this can
municipality can permit the streets to be
best be left to the determination of the
used for such purposes. It is very gen- municipal
authorities, who are supposed
erally conceded that under the powers
to be best acquainted with the wants and
ordinarily conferred upon municipalities,
necessities of the citizens generally. To
they have the right to regulate the use
say that a new mode of passage shall be
ot the streets. It is also well settled,
banisbed from the streets, no matter bow
that the use of a street by a railway is nuch the
general good may require, it,
legitimate. In Murphy v. City of OUimply becanse streets were not so used
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in the days of Blackstone, would hardly
omport with the advancement and enlightenment of the present age. * * *
But for this reason (certain disadvantages) the property owners along the
a-et capnot expect to stop such improvementa. The convenience of those who
live at a greater distance from the centre
of a city requires the use of such improvements, and for their benefit the owners
of procrty upon the street must submit
to the burthen when the common council
determine that the public good requires
it." And in Milbr v. Cedar Rapids,
12 Iowa 260, it was said that, "the
laying down and operating a railway
track over a part of a street is not an
unreasonable obstruction of its free use,
nor incompatible with its original dedication, but rather a new and improved
way of using the same, germane to their
principal object as a passage-way, markr
ing the progress of civilization in this
age, and to which the genius of the law
readily accommodates itself, as should,
also, the genius and habits of the people."
When a common council is empowered
to "improve" streets,'is a proposed improvemeut to be regarded as a judicial
question? "If a municipal corporation,
in the exercise of its authority over streets,
determines that iron rails and their use
by the licensed portion of the public are
a legitimate street improvement, I am
not aware of any power in us to determine otherwise. * * * I should regard
it as a usurpation by courts of power
which does not belong to them, if they
undertake to control the municipal author,
ity in this respect: ComsTOC, J., in
14 N. Y. 532. Very much to the same
effect was the language of the Iowa court
in Millburn v. City of Cedar, Rapids, 12
Iowa 246,where the court ask and answer
in the negative this queslion "If in the
exercise of their (the common council's)
proprietary rights and police regulations
over the streets, they should determine
that iron rails and their use are a legiti-

mate street improvement, upon what
ground can this court determine otherwise, or control their authority in this
respect? We apprehend none."
Whether a distinction is to be drawn
between a railway operated by horse
and steam-power, and whether a city
may authorize the former and not the
latter, is an interesting question not considered in the principal case. It is worthy of notice, however, that the courts
have declared in numerous cases that the
use of a street by a railway operated by
steam is a legitimate and an improved
method of use. The distinction cannot
be based upon the idea that a horse-railWay is operated principally for the benefit
of the inhabitants of the municipality,
while a steam-railway running beyond
the municipality is principally for the
benefit of the outside -public. The municipality holds the fee of the streets in
trust, not for the local public, but for the
use of the people of the whole state.
Neitheris the distinction to be based ujon
the theory that a steam-railway tends to
frighten horses. , In Macomber v. Nikols, 34 Mich. 212, the Supreme Court of
Michigan, through Chief Justice Coocmy,
say: "Persons making use of horses as
the means of travel or traffic by the highways have no rights therein superior to
tho0e who make use of the ways in other
modes. * * * In some of the larger cities
of the country sufficient means of transit
by the old methods have become practically out of the question, and steam-power
is permitted as a matter of necessity, not
only as a means of moving vehicles by
the side of teams in the street, but also
over their heads, where the liability to
cause fright would be perhaps still greare,
Horses of ordinary gentleness would at
first be liable to take fright, but after a
time they become accustomed to the objects that at first are so fearful to them,
just as in the country they become accustomed to see trains of cars passing
near them along the ordinary railways,
which sometimes for a considerable dis-
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tance run in immediate proximity to the* et -e.; 2 Redfield
onRailwa3 s, 5th ed.,
common roads. Horses may be, andS 4 08 et
seq.
often are, frightened by locomotives, in
But when a railroad uses a street, withboth town and country, but it would be
out any legal authority for so doing, i.
as reasonable to treat the horse as a pubseems to be held as matter of law, that
lic nuisance, from his tendency to shy and it is a nuisance
per se: The Attor
be frightened by umaccustomed objects, General
v. 1e Morris,4-c, RailroadG6.,
as to regard the locomotive as a public 19 N.J.
Eq. 393 ; Davis v. 27weMaor,
njuisance from its tendency to frighten the
., 14 N. Y. 525; Commonwealth v.
horse. * * * Only the paramount author- Vermont, 4-.,
Railroad Co., 4 Gray 24.
ity of the legislature can give to either
Admitting, then, that the existence of
the owner of the horse or the owier of
the railroad in the street, is per se a nuithe locomotive exclusive privileges."
saunce, the question is presented, whether
II. Assuming, however, that a muni- the municipality is liable
in a private accipality has no authority to grant the use tion to a person injured
thereby. If such
of its streets for railway purposes, is the an action can .be
maintained, it must be
city liable to a third person injured thereupon the ground that the city is liable for
by? In the principal case the city of the neglect
of a public duty-the duty
Davenport is held liable for such an inof keeping its streets in repair and free
jury. The manner in which this conclu- from obstructions.
sion was reached will attract attention
In Hill v. City qf Boston, 122 Mass.
from its novelty. With due deference to 344, the liability
of a municipal corpothe learned court, we may perhaps be aration to a private action for a neglect of
lowed to say that it is somewhat doubtful a
general duty was considered in a very
whether anything similar can be found in
elaborate and learned opinion by Chief
any previous adjudication. The argaJustice GRAY, in which the English and
ment being that because the city had no American
authorities were carefully exauthoritgto give permission, it was thereamined. The court in that case decided
fore liable for the results of the thing that a child attending a public
school in
done under the permission by some one a school-house
provided by a city, under
else.
the duty imposed upon it by general
Conceding, however, that the city laws, cannot maintain an action
against
had no authority to grant the permission the city for an injury suffered
by reason
referred to, the question that then arises of the unsafe condition of a staircase in
is, whether the city would have been lia- the school-house, over which
he was passble in a similar action in case it had not
ing. The opinion of the court occupies
given express license, but had merely some thirty-five
pages, and commences
stood passively by and permitted the rail- with the statement, that
"We had suproad company to use the street.
posed it to be well settled in this ComThe law seems to be that where a rail- monwealth that no private action, unless
road has been authorized to use a street
authorized by express statute, can be
by the proper authorities it cannot be maintained
against a city for the neglect
considered as a nuisance per se: Millburn
of a public duty imposed upon it by law
v. Cedir Rapids, 12 Iowa 246 ; New
for the benefit of the public, and from
Albany, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. O'Daily, the performance of which the corpora12 Ind. 531.
tion receives no profit or advantage."
In such cases, the question whether or And again it is. said, "Although the
not it is a nuisance is one of fact depend- English books contain numerous cases of
ent upon the circumstances of the par- indictments or information for neglect to
ticular case : Wood on Nuisances, J 284
repair highways and bridges, no instance
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has been referred to, in the frequent discussions of the subject in England and in
this country, in which an English court
has sustained a private action against a
public or se.idpal awporatiox or quasi
corpocation for suchneglect, except under
a swm expressly or by necessary implicatioi giving such a remedy. * * * The
English authorities uniformly hold that a
county, town or pauh being liable at
common law to indictment only, and not
to action for neglect to repair a highway,
therefore, when the duty to repair, which
before rested upon the county, town or
parish is transferred by statute to a public officer or to a municipal corporation,
or a board incorporated for the purpose,
such officer or corporation is no more
liablc to private action than the county,
town or parish previously was, unless
the statute transferring the duty clearly
manifests an intention in the legislature
to impose the additional liability. * * *
The result of the English authorities is,
that when a duty is imposed upon a municipal corporation for the benefit of the
public, without any consideration, or
emolument received by the corporation,
it is only where the duty is a new one,
and is such as is ordinarily performed
by trading corporations, that an intention to give a private action for a neglect
in its performance is to be presumed. * * *
The result of this review of the American
cases may be summed up as follows:
There is no case in which the neglect of
a duty, imposed by general law upon all
cities and towns alike, has been held to
sustain an action by a person injured
thereby against a city, when it would not
against a town. The only decisions of
the state courts, in which the mere grant
by the legislature of a city charter, authorizing and requiring the city to perform certain duties, has been held sufficient to render the city liable to a private
action for neglect in their performance,
when a town would not be so liable, are
in New York since 1850, and in Illinois.
In the absence of such binding
* *

decisions, we find it difficult to reconcile
the view, that the mere acceptance of a
municipal charter is to be considered as
conferring such a benefit upon the corporation as will render it liable to private
action for neglect of the duties thereby
imposed upon it."
In Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84;
s.c. 9 Am. Law Reg. 670, the Supreme
Court of Michigan decided that a muutcipal corporation was not liable in a private -action for damages, for injuries
caused by neglect to keep the streets in
repair. The decision was pronounced by
Chief Justice CAmPBELL, who reviews
the cases and distinguishes those founded
on mere neglect from those of positive
misfeasance. And see to same effect,
Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. L. 394;
Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Texas 525;
Winbigler v. Los Angdos, 45 Cal. 36.

That municipal corporations are liable
to a private action in the following cases
is,we believe, everywhere conceded:
1. In those cases in which a municipality, holding and dealing with property
as its own, and not in the discharge of a
public duty, nor for the direct and immediate use of the public, but for its own
benefit, receiving rents or profits therefrom as a private owner might, is guilty
of negligence in the management or use
of such property to the injury of others:
Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; Oliver
Worcester, 102 lass. 489; Scott v.
Mayor, 4-c., of M3anchester, 1 H. & N.
59 ; s. c. 2 Id. 204; Cowley v. Mayor,
4-c., of Sunderland, 6 H. & N. 565.
2. In those cases in which a municipality dealing with public property in the
discharge of a public duty, nevertheless
commits an act of positive misfeasance:
Anthony v. Adams, I Mete. 284, 285 ;
Lawrence v. Fairhaven, 5 Gray 110;
Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208.
To this class belong the cases of Lee v.
The Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N. T.
443, and City of Pekin v. Newell, 26 I1
320, cited by the court in the principal
case.
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3. Anafinally those cases in which the
municipality is rendered liable by some
express statutory provision. ,
In view of the recent decisions of the
Supreme Courts of Massachusetts and
Michigan, two of the ablest courts of the
United States, it must be regarded as
matter of regret that the Supreme Court
of Iowa did not more fully consider the
liability of a municipal corporation to a
private action for a neglect of a public
duty. For, conceding that the railroad
was not legally authorized to a the

streets of the city of Davenport, and u
therefore a public nuisance pr se, which
the city was bound to abate, it would
seem that there is very high authorityfor
the proposition, that the city was, nevertheles, not liable in a private action, to
a person injured thereby, for its failure
to abate the said nuisance, in the absence
of some express statutory provision in the
laws of Iowa creating the liability.
HZXnx W"Z RooZm.
Minneapolis.

Supreme Court of Wisconjin.
MINNIE T. CARHART XT
RESPONDZTS,

AL., BY TRflR

GuARni.N, JOSHUA DALTON,

v. W. D. HARSHAW,

APPLLANT.

Where a parent, in consideration of love and affection, makes an absolute gift of
exempt property to his child, and completes the transfer by a manual delivery of the
property, fraud cannot be imputed to the transfer merely because it is voluntary, and
the child will hold the property as against the creditors of the parent.

APPPEA from Circuit Court of Winnebago county.
Hooper and Buxton, attorneys for appellant.
Haus8erand Coleman, attorneys for respondents.
COLE, J.-Notwithstanding the ingenious criticisms of the acute
and learned counsel for the defendant upon the charge of the Circuit Court, a majority of the court think there was nothing in the
charge which could have misled the jury to the prejudice of his
client. The portion of the charge to which the first exception was
taken reads as follows: "I say to you ' as a proposition of law,' it
being conceded that they were exempt as his library, that he had
the right to sell them for a valuable consideration to any one, and
when sold for a valuable consideration to a purchaser, that they
were still not liable to seizure and sale upon execution for his
debts." It was a conceded fact in the case that the library in
question was Dr. Carhart's professional library at the time he
claimed to have given it to his children, the plaintiffs in the action,
and that he might then have held it as exempt by statute as his
private library. But it is objected that the above charge was not
applicable to the facts, and was likely to mislead the jury, because
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there was no pretence of a sale of the library for a valuable consideration. It is certainly true that the plaintiffs claimed the
library by way of gift and not by purchase from their father. But
in the charge, as well as in someof the instructiona asked by defendant, it was assumed that a transfer by.gift or sale was subject, to
and controlled by the same rules of law, and this, doubtless, will
accoust for this language in the charge. For instance,- in the sixth
request asked by the defendant, .wefind these words: "The question for the jury to determine is,.was this sale or transfer by gift,
fraudulent and void as to existing creditors," &o. The same form
of expression is used in the second request where the transfer is
spoken of as a sale. So while it may be true .that the plaintiffs
did not claim to have purchased the library, yet it seems impossible
that the jury could have been misled by what the court said in
regard to a sale. In the same oonnection the court added this:
"He (Dr. Carhart), also had the right to donate them for a consideration, and the love and affection which the law presumes he
bears for his children is a sufficient consideration. He hai the
right then in consideration.of his love and affection for his children
to donate them to his children, give them to them, and if that gift
for this consideration was followed by an actual manual delivery of
the property to his children it was still and continued to be not
liable to seizure and sale upon execution by creditors. So that I
have taken away from your consideration all questions of fraudulent transfers so far as the sale or gift to his children is concerned."
Also in a subsequent part of the charge the court made use of this
language: "Therefore, I say, if you find there was a gift of these
books to his children, followed by a mapual actual delivery, in consideration of the love and affection which the law presumes the
parent bears to his child, it is a good transfer and thereafter the
property is not liable for his debts any more than it was prior to
the date of the gift." These portions of the charge were likewise
excepted to. Now the idea advanced or proposition laid. down in
this charge as we understand it is this: A parent may in consideration of love and affection make a valid gift of exempt property to
his child, and when the gift is completed by a manual delivery of
the property the child will hold it as against the creditors of the
parent. In case of non-exempt property the debtor would not be
permitted to make such a disposition of his property to the prejudice of the rights of his creditors. The law requires a man to
VOL. XXVII- 4
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be just before he is generous, and the fact that the transfer was
without consideration would be deemed a strong if not a conclusive
badge of fraud. But in case of exempt property which the creditor
has no right in law to subject to the payment of his debts the rule
is otherwise. In respect to such property the parent may in consideration of love and affection donate it to his child, and where the
gift is followed by actual manual delivery of the property to the
child it is placed beyond the reach of the creditors of the parent.
In other words, fraud cannot be imputed to such a transfer of property merely because it is voluntary or without consideration. This
is the meaning of the charge as we understand it, and with this
interpretation it is not fairly open to criticism. The court is
evidently speaking of a sale or gift of exempt property which
actually passes the title and ownership to the vendee or donee as
against the parent, and where the child is clothed with full dominion
and control of the property.
There is another passage in the charge which *as excepted to,
and which was much commented upon in the argument made by
defendant's counsel. It is the following: "Being so exempt, I say
to you the law is, he had the right to sell them; he had the right
to donate them, and it is perfectly immaterial whether he designed
to defraud creditors or not; the property being exempt, the disposal of them could not defraud the creditors, because the creditors
had no right to them." This, it is said, was equivalent to laying
down the broad, naked proposition, that in no case, under no circumstances, can fraud, as against a creditor, be predicated upon a
transfer of exempt property by a debtor. So that it would logically
follow from this doctrine that if an unscrupulous debtor should
make a mere colorable sale or gift of exempt property to a friend,
to be held in secret trust for his own use, then acquire additional
exempt property, as far as the funds of his creditor in his hands
would enable him to do, and make a like disposition of it to another
friend, to be held in the same manner, and continue these transactions indefinitely, he could always cover up his property and keep
it from his creditors. .This is not a fair inference or deduction
from the charge, nor does the doctrine laid down by the Circuit
Court lead to any such mischievous and absurd consequences. All
through the charge the court is treating of an absolute sale or gift:
not a mere colorable one-a sale or gift where the title and ownerihip of the property passes to the vendee or donee. It is the same
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as though the court had told the jury that a debtor has the right to
make an absolute sale or gift of exempt property to a child or friend,
and that the motive with which such a transfer was made was immaterial or of no consequence to his creditor. The doctrine of the
charge is the same in principle as that stated by Mr. Justice PAINE
m Pike v. Mile#, 23 Wis. 164, when considering the effect of a
conveyance by the husband to his wife of the homestead. He says
that such a "conveyance cannot be held fraudulent as to creditors,
for the reason, that being exempt it was no more beyond their reach
after the conveyance than before." Substantially the same thing
is said in Bond v. Seymour, 2 Pin. 105, and Dreutser v. Bell, 11
Wis. 118. The following authorities are to the same effect: Miurphy v. Crouch, 24 Wis. 365; Hibben v. Sayer, 33 Id. 319; Smith
v. 1?umsey, 33 Mich. 183; Smith v. Allen, 39 Miss. 169; Edmondson v. Meacham, 50 Id. 34; (rummen v. Bennett, 68 N. C.
494; Duvall v. Rollins, 71 Id. 218; Danforth v. Beattie, 43 Vt.
138; LisRy et al. v. Perry et al., 2 Bush 515; Kuevan v. Specker,
11 Id. 1; Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298; Hannan v. Merrill,
11 Allen 582; Cox v. Wilder, 2 Dillon 45. It is claimed that
the principle to be extracted from these and other like cases, goes
only to this extent, that a transfer of exempt property will not be
held void as a fraud upon creditors, when the effect of such determination will be to put the property in the hands of the fraudulent
vendor still exempt. But if the circumstances of the debtor have
so changed that he could no longer hold it as exempt if the sale be
set aside, then the transfer will be avoided for fraud at the instance
of the creditor. It seems to us the true test is, was the sale or gift
valid when made? If the ownership and title then passes absolutely
from the debtor so that he cannot afterwards have or claim any
benefit from it, the transfer is unimpeachable on the part of creditors. In this case, it is said, while Dr. Carhart might hold the
library as exempt as a professional library, he had no right, under
the color of a pretended gift of it to his children, to hold it as a
merchandise for sale. The Circuit Court did not rule that he had
the right to hold it in that manner. On the contrary, in another
place, the court charged that if the store was Dr. Carhart's, carried
on for his benefit, he being the owner of the property-the books in
trade-but was carried on in the name of his children, as a cover to
keep the property from his creditors, then that the books were liable
to sale on execution. This charge was also criticised on the argu-
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ment, though no exception was taken to it, because the questios

was submitted, whether the store belonged to Dr. Carhart, when,
there was no claim or pretence that it did. But the court likewise
submitted the question, whether Dr. Carhart owned the property or
books in trade. And while the evidence showed that the plaintiffs
had in the store other books for sale besides those they had received
from their father, yet the meaning of the charge is plain. As there
is no legal restraint upon the debtor against selling, or even giving
away, his exempt property, we cannot see that the motive with
which he does it i&material, so long as there is no secret trust in his
favor.
Our views upon the controlling question in the ease render it
unnecessary to notice specifically the refusal to give the instructions
asked by the defendant.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Ryrii C. J., dissented.
The doctrine of this case seems unquestionably correct, both upon principle and
authority. In respect to the analogous
case of a fraudulent conveyance of real
estate, subject to the right of homestead,
the great weight of authority is in favor
of the doctrine that a conveyanoe set aside
for fraud, at the suit of the husband's creditors, does not estop the grantor or his
wife from claiming a homestead in the
premises thus conveyed : Thompson on
Homesteads and Exemptions,. J 408 ;
Kueva v. Specer, 1 IBush I ; Cox v.
Wilder, 2 Dill. C. C. 45 ; Smith v. Kehr,
Id. 63; Crumnen v. Bennett, 68 N. C.
494; Danforth v. Beattie, 43 Vt. 138;
Searsv. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298 ; Castle
v. Palmer, 6 Allen 401 ; Pennington v.
Seal, 49 Miss. 527 ; EBdmonson v. Meacham, 50 Id. 34; Smith v. Ramsey, 33
Mch. 191; McFarlandv.- Goodman, 6'
Biss. III ; Dreutser v. Bell, II WiSe.
114; Pike v. Miles, 23 Id. 164; Mrphey v. Crouch, 24 Id. 365; Wood v.
Chambers, 20 Tex. 254; Vogler v. Montgomery, 54 Mo. 577 ; Huganin v. Dewey,
20 Iowa 368 ; Muller v. Inderreids, 79"

IL 302; W/dte v. Give=, 29 Io. An.
571 ; Cottenham's Succession, Id.

669.

See also, Graen v. Marks, 25 IL 221;
Cole v. Green, 21 Id. 104. There are,
however, a number of cases holding the
contrary doctrine: Getler v. Saroni, IS
Ill. 511; Piper v. Johnston, 12 Minn.
60; Chambers v. Sallie, 29 Ark. 407.;
Huey's Appeal, 29 Penn. St. 219 ; Currior v. Sutherland, 54 N. H. 478; Gibbs
v. Patton, S. C. Tenn., ii Chicago Jeg.
News 398.

The reasons assigned for this rule, as
deduced from the -cases by Mr. Thosp.
son, in his valuable work on Homesteads
(J 409, 410), are stated to be, "first,
that the homestead privilege is created for
the benefit of the wife and children, as
well as for that of the husband and father;
and, therefore, it is not right that theformer should be prejudiced by the wrongful
act of the latter; second, that the con
veyance being Toid as to creditors, it
stands as to them as though it had never
been made. If it had not been made,
the debtor or his wife could have asserted
the right of homestead in the premises
against them; and they cannot assume
the inconsistent positions of asserting the
nuty.of the conveyance, and claiming a
right under it ;" as they must by insisting
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ihat it iR fraudulent and void as against
them, and at the same time of sufficient
validity to work an estoppel or constitute
an abandonment of the homestead. "Expressed in still another way, the interest,
which the creditor has in the property by
virtme of his lieu, is a-derivative interest,
proceeding from the debtor and depend-nt upon his title. Hence the creditor
cannot acquire a right under the debtor's
tite, and at the san time impeach that
title. He cannot sell, under his execution, the debtor's title, and at the-same
time deny the debtor's rights of homestead on the ground that the latter has
no title :" ( 410.) Another reason,
and one that seems entirely satisfactory,
is that the homestead being exempt from
sale on execution at the suit of creditors,
the latter cannot be injured by any disposition that maybe made of it, and cannot, therefore, predicate fraud of any conveyance of the property ; or, as stated by
Mr. Thompson ( 411), "as to exempt
property there are, within the meaning
of the Statute of Frauds, no ceditors.
Stateat creating exemptions were not designed to imprison the debtor in his homestead, nor to fetter the transfer of his
chattels." Upon the same grotnd rests
the English doctrine that in order to make
a voluntary conveyance void as to creditors, either existing or subsequent, it is
indispensable that it should transfer property, which would be liable to be taken
in execution for the payment of debts:
I Story's Eq. Jur., 367.
Where the fraudulent conveyance includes not only the homestead, but other
*property, also, which is not exempt, or
,where the homestead exceeds the value
allowed by law, as to such other property
or the excess in value over the amount
exempted by law, the conveyance may
of course be attached by creditors, and
such excess subjected to the payment of
their claims in the manner provided by
the law. And where the owner of a
homestead, in order to defraud his creditors, conveys it to another 'with a secret

reservation in favor of himself or some
other member of his family, neither he
nor they, in the event of his death, can
claim another homestead or an allowance in lieu thereof, out of the corpus of
his estate not embraced in such conveyance. Thia is but another application
of the obvious rule that, as against creditors, no single debtor nor any single
family of a debtor can hold two home
steeds: Thompson on Homesteads,
J 279, 419 ; Currier v. Sutherland, 54
N. H. 475; Woodall v. B udd, 41 Tex.
375.
As to fraudulent dispositions of chattels exempt from sale on execution, it
would seem clear that the same princi'ples should prevail; and so many cases
hold. See Vaughan v. Thompson, 17
fM. 78 ; Cole v. Green, 21 Id. 105 ; McCord v. Moore, 5 Heisk. 734 ; Callaway v. Carpenter, 10 Ala. 500; Wilcox
v. Hawley, 31 N. Y. 648 ; Hetrick v.
Campbell, 14 Penn. St. 263; Duvall v.
Rollins, 68 N. C. 220 ; s. c. 71 N.C.
221 ; Moseley v Anderson, 40 Miss. 49 ;
Meyehe v. Draper, 21 Mo. 510 ; Anthony v. Wade, 1 Bush 110; Patton v.
Smith, 4 Conn. 450; Tracy v. Cover,
28 Ohio St. 61. See also Vandibur v.
Love, 10 Ind. 54. The contrary is, however, held more or less distinctly by a
considerable number of cases. See Cook
v. Scott, I Gilm. 344; Cassell v. Williams, 12 Ill. 390 ; Diffenderferv. Fisher,
3 Grant Cas. 30; Freeman v. Smith, 30
Penn. St. 264; Gilleland v. Rhoads, 34
Id. 187; Smith v. Emerson, 43 Id. 456 ;
Emerson v. Smith, 51 Id. 90 ; Stronse v.
Becker, 38 Id. 190; Larkin v. McAnnally, 5 Phila. 17 ; Carl v. Smith, 8 Id.
569; Mandlove v. Burton, 1 Ind. 39 ;
Sugg v. Tillman, 2 Swan 208; Byrd
v. Curlin, 1 Humph. 466 ; Brackett v.
Watkins, 21 Wend. 68.
The rule as to chattels is also doubtless subject to the same limitation which
prevails in respect to real estate, that
where a gift of exempt property is made
with a secret reservation for the benefit
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of the donor, he cannot thereafter acquire
other exempt property and claim the
benefit of the exemption as to both the
property disposed of and that newly acquired. Nor, as it clearly seems, if the
sale or gift is merely colorable, and the
relationof the owner to it or his circmstances subsequently so change that he
would no longer be entitled to claim it
as exempt, if there had been no disposition of it, will he or those claiming

under bim be entitled to claim the bone.
fit of the exemption. The true test
sem to be that stated in the principal
case. Was the sale or gift valid when
made I If the ownership and title then
passed absolutely from the debtor so that
heeouldnotafterwardhaveorclimanY
benefit from it, no irand has been comnitted and the transfer is unimpeachable
on the part of creditors.
HARMHLL D. EwZXL.

Supreme Court of lllinoi.
UNITED STATES MORTGAGE CO. v.J. GROSS XT AL.
Foreign corporations were not authorized, in Illinois, prior to the Act of April 9th
1875, to loan money within that state, and securities for money so loaned were void,
but that act not only enables them to loan money there, but also validates their previous loans, and is constitutional.
The comity between states does not require that a state should allow a foreign corporation to exercise powers denied to its own corporations.

THIS was a cross-bill filed by Gross, as a second mortgagee, to
declare null and void the first mortgage, held by the U. S. Mortgage Co., on the ground that it was a foreign corporation, and for
other relief.
BAKER, J.-We will first examine as to the validity of the mortgage executed by Lombard to the United States Mortgage Co.
The charter of that company is not incorporated in the record,
but from its name, the character of its transaction here involved, and
the facts appearing in the case, we may reasonably conclude its
principal or sole business was, and is, to loan money, taking to
itself mortgages on real estate to secure the same.
The general incorporation law of 1872, which was in force when
the mortgage was executed, provided for the formation, in the state,
of companies for any lawful purpose, expressly excepting, however,
corporations for banking, insurance, real estate brokerage, operation of railroads, and the business of loaning money. Section 26
of the act provided that "foreign corporations, and the officers and
agents thereof, doing business in this state, shall be subjected to all
the liabilities, restrictions and duties that are or may be imposed
upon corporations of like character organized under the general laws
of this state, and shall have no other or greater powers.
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"And no foreign or domestic corporation, established or maintainad in any way for the pecuniary profit of its stockholders or
members, shall purchase or hold real estate in this state, except as
provided for in this act."
From these statutory enactments we deduce these conclusions:
The latter sentence of section 26 was aimed at the purchasing and
holding of real estate by corporations, for the reason such acts would
tend to create perpetuities ; and by this and other provisions of the
same act, the evil feared was effectually guarded against. We think,
however, it was not designed thereby to prevent corporations from
taking mortgages on real estate as security for debts. In fact, the
act contemplates corporations will acquire real estate in satisfaction
of indebtedness due them, and makes such provision in the fifth
section for the sale of real estate so taken, as secures the state
against the evil had in legislative view, and which had been discussed by this court in Carroll v. The C;ty of East ;3t. Louis, 67
Ill. 568. Indeed, it is difficult to see how mortgages, which are
conveyances, subject to conditions of defeasance, can be considered
as tending to create perpetuities. Payments made of the debts thus
secured, defeat the titles of the mortgagees, and even if they take
possession. the incomes gradually undermine and destroy their
titles. If the premises are sold under powers, the mortgagees cannot themselves become purchasers; and if the mortgages are forelosed by suit, the decrees of the court thereafter become the basis
of title.
But we see from the first sentence of this section 26, it was the
policy of the state that foreign corporations should have no other or
greater powers in the state than corporations of like character, organized under the general laws of the state; and further see from
the first section of the act, it was a part of that same policy that
corporations shall not be formed in the state for the business of
loaning money. It follows, that corporations organized in a foreign
state, for such business of loaning money, could not claim to pursue
such business in this state. The comity between the states does
not demand we should hold that this mortgage company, incorporated under an act of the state of New York, could lawfully within
this state exercise powers denied to corporations within our own
borders. All the acts of this company here done in furtherance of
such business of loaning money were invalid, as being obnoxious to
our policy and institutions.
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The Act of April 9th 1875, provides, among other things, that
any corporation formed under the laws of any other state or country,
and authorized by its charter to invest or loan money, may invest
or loan money iithis state. And any such corporation that may
have invested or lent money, as aforesaid, may have the same rights
and powers for the recovery thereof, subject to the same penalties
for usury, as private persons, citizens of this state; and when a sale
is made under any judgment, decree, or power in a mortgage or
deed, such corporation may purchase in its corporate name, the property offered fhr sale, and become vested with the title wherever a
natural person might so do in like cases: L. 1875, p. 65.
It was the evident intention of this latter act, not only to change
somewhat the policy of the state, but to validate such contracts as
that here under consideration. It is urged by appellant, that even
if the mortgage was theretofore invalid, it was rendered valid and
binding by this act; and by appellee it is contended the act thus
construed, would deprive him of his property without due process
of law, and take from him a vested right.
A statute must have a prospective operation only, unless its terms
show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively. Here there is no doubt that the statute is retroactive; it is
expressly so on its face. Unless there be a constitutional inhibibition, a legislature has power, when it interferes with no vested
right, to enact retrospective statutes to validate invalid contracts,
or to ratify and confirm any act it might lawfully have authorized
in the first instance. We do not deem it necessary to cite any of
the many cases where this doctrine has been announced or followed.
In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 874, it is said:
" When such acts go no further than to bind a party by a contract
which he has attempted to enter into, but which was invalid by
reason of some personal inability on his part to make it, or through
neglect of some legal formality, or in consequence of some ingredient in the contract forbidden by law, the question they suggest is
one of policy and not one of constitutional power."
Lombard borrowed the money and attempted to make a valid
contract of mortgage to secure its payment, and he was, if not
legally, at least in justice and good conscience, bound thereby; and
it is clear the mortgage might well be validated so far as regards
him. But it is claimed, the rights of third persons have intervened
which cannot be affected by this legislation. The true line of dis-
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tinction is laid down by Cooley in his work on Constitutional Lim-

itations, just quoted from. On pages 378 and 379, he says: "The
operation of these cases, however, must be carefully restricted to
the parties to the original contract, and to such other persons as
may have succeeded to their rights with no greater equities. A
subsequent onafide purchaser cannot be deprived of the property
which -he has acquired, by an act which retrospectively deprives
his grantor of the title which he had when the purchase was made.
Conoeding that the invalid deed may be made good as between the
parties, yet if, while it remained invalid, and the grantor still
retained the legal title to the land, a third person has purchased,
and received a conveyance, with no notice of any fact which should
preclude his acquiring an equitable as well as a legal title thereby,
it would -not be in -the power of the legislature to so confirm the
original deed as to divest him of the title he has acquired. The
position of the case is altogether changed by this purchase. The
legal title is no longer separated from equities, but in the hands of
the. second purchaser is united with an equity as strong as that
which'exists in favor of him who purchased first.
"Under such circumstances, even the courts of equity must
recognise the right of the second purchaser as best, and as entitled
tio the usual protection which the law accords to vested interests."
We understand the rule to be that where a third party purchases
under such state of facts as would preclude his acquiring an equitable as well as a legal title, the legislature may confirm the original
contract so as to protect him. So here, the National Life Insurance
Company had and has no equity as against the United States Mortgage Company, and bought expressly subject to its equity, and
agreed as a part of the purchase.money for the premises, to pay the
debt which was in equity and good morals due from Lombard to the
Mortgage Company. It would be inequitable and unjust to permit
the Insurance Company, were it here defending against this mortgage, it having agreed to pay $100,173 for these lots, the larger
portion of which was in the assumption of the debt of Lombard to
the Mortgage Company, and secured or attempted to be secured by
the mortgage expressly subject to which it purchased, to now hold
this valuable property, discharged of their debt. It received full
consideration for this assumption of the mortgage debt, and to now
keep and possess the property released therefrom, would be such
want of good faith on its part, both towards Lombard, its grantor,
Vor.+XXVII.--5

U. S. MORTGAGE CO. v. GROSS.

whose debt it was paid for assuming, and to appellant, as a court of
equity would be loth to sanction.
We think it is evident the Insurance Company took the lots
with no greater equities than existed in Lombard, the party to the
original mortgage contract with appellant.
Great stress is laid by appellee upon the case of Thompson v.
Morgan, 6 Minn. 295; and it is said that case is exactly like the
one at bar. We do not think the cases are analogous. Even if we
assume the doctrine of that case to be correct, a point it is not
deemed necessary to here examine, yet there is a broad and fundamental distinction between the two cases. In that case the -court
held that the mortgage from Folsom to Morgan was ineffectual to
pass an interest in the land, because not executed in conformity with
statutory requirements, and that, although Folsom afterwards conveyed the premises to Babcock, subject to the Morgan mortgage,
and so expressed in the deed, yet he could safely take the title subject to the mortgage, and rely upon the defence that was patent
upon its face for protection, and that the curative act of July 26th
1858, could have no effect to validate the Morgan mortgage, to the
prejudice of Babcock or of Thompson, who claimed under him.
But, it will be noted, the gist of the case is the mere notice to
Babcock, and the question was, whether such notice changed his
status as regarded the character and defects of the mortgage.
And the court said: "Babcock might, perhaps, have estopped
himself from questioning the validity of this mortgage by an
appropriate clause in his deed recognising it as a subsisting lien,
and waiving its defects; but the mere admission of notice that such
a mortgage existed, by a recital of it in this deed, through which
he derived his title, would not operate such a consequence." We
regard this as a plain intimation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that had this element of a recognition of the mortgage as a
lien and waiver of defects appeared in the record, the decision of
that case would have been otherwise.
In the case at bar, the premises were not only sold subject to the
mortgage, but there was an express assumption of the mortgage
debt, and a promise to pay that mortgage debt as a part of the consideration of the purchase. The facts of this case go far beyond a
mere notice; and beyond even that which seems to have been* * * * * *
deemed sufficient in Thompson v. Morgan.
Our conclusion is, it was entirely competent for the General
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Assembly to validate the mortgage in question, not only as to the
parties to the original contract, but as to Gross, the assignee of the
equitable interest in the trust deed; since, under the circumstances
of the case, he has no such equities as will give him a vested right
as against the equities of the mortgage company. A party cannot
have a vested right contrary to equity and justice.' * * * *
The policy of the legislation of Illinois,
up to the time of the passage of the Act
of April 9th 1875, above referred to, has
always been steadily against'allowing
corporations, either domestic or foreign,
to hold real estate within the state, either
in fee or as security, except such as might
be necessary for the conduct of their busines, or such as they might take for
debts previously incurred, in which latter
case, however, they are compelled to sell
it within a limited time.
This policy the Supreme Court of the
state fully approved, and firmly enforced
whenever a case came before them.
The leading case now is that of Carroll
v. City of East St. Lozds, 67 Ills. 568,
which was an action of ejectment for the
recovery of premises sold by a corporation organized in the state of Connecticut
for the purchase and sale of real estate,
and which had expended its whole capital
stock in the purchase of land in Illinois,
of which they went into possession. The
Supreme Court held, in a carefully considered opinion, that as a corporation
created in one state cannot exercise its
functions in another without permission,
and as there was no direct legislation
upon the subject, recourse must be had to
the public policy of the state as indicated
by the general course of legislation, and
as that had been directed against the creation of perpetuities in the tenure of property, the purchase by the Connecticut
Land Company was repugnant to the
general policy of the state, and the sale
was void, and that the company having
acquired no title to the real estate, could
convey none.

On the question of the comity between
Ducat
states, the Supreme Court held, ifi
v. City of Chicago, 48 Il1. 172, that it
was a voluntary act of the sovereign
power, and ceased to be binding whenever
its exercise was deemed to be contrary to
the policy of the state, or prejudicial to
its interests, and that a discrimination
could be rightfully made between foreign
and domestic corporations of the same
character, even to the extent of compelling
the former to leave the state ; and that
the constitutional provision that " the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens
of the several states," did not apply to
the case, a foreign corporation not being
a "citizen" within the meaning of the
constitution. This deci-ion was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of the United States*
in 10 Wall. 410.
In the case of Metropolitan Bank v.
Godfrey, 23 Ill. 579, where the bank was
organized under the general banking law
of New York, it was held incompetent to
take and convey lands in its corporate
name, and that as it had no legal capacity
to receive the title, the conveyance was
absolutely void for want of a grantee
capable of taking and holding the land.
So in the case of Starkzceather v. Tle
50, where
American Bible Society, 72 Ill.
the father of the appellant had devised an
undivided eighth of his estate, which consisted principally of realty, to the trustees
of the Bible Society, the Supreme Court
held, affirming the East St. Lotis Case,
supra, that the corporation was incapable
of taking the title, and that, therefore,
the devise failed, and the estate descended
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to the heirs free from any claim of the
society, legal or equitable.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in
a case which aroused much interest
(The State ex rd. v. Peter Doyle, Secretary of State, 40 Wise. 220), took strong
ground in upholding the absolute authority of the state legislature and state
tribunals in establishing and enforcing
terms and conditions upon foreign corporations, doing business within that
state, the legislature having passed an
act making it a condition precedent for
a foreign insurance company, establishing an agency in that state, that it should
stipulate not to remove to the federal
court any writs which might be brought
against it.
The state Supreme Court
held the act constitutional, in opposition
to the ruling of the United States Circuit
Court, and when the latter case went
to the U. S. Supreme Court (94 U. S.
Rep., 4 Otto 535), that tribunal, following Paulv. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, reversed the decree of its circuit court, thus
practically affirming the opinion of the
state court, and declaring that the insurance company had no constitutional
right to do business in that state, and
had only the option to conform to the
conditions prescribed by the state or retire from its limits.

The United States Supreme Court, in
the Bank of Augustd v. Earle, 13 Peters
519, considered the question of the comity
between states, and the rights accruing
thereunder, and Chief Justice Tncx
delivering the opinion of the court, said,
"that whenever the interest or policy
of any state required it to restrict the
rule of comity, it has but to declare its
will, and the legal presumption is at once
at an end ; that whenever a state sufficiently indicates that contracts which
derive their validity from its comity are
repugnant to its policy or are considered
as injurious to its interests, the presumption in favor of its adoption can no
longer be made."
This case was approved in Runyan v. Lessee of Cosler, 14
Peters 122, where it was held, that every
power which a corporation exercises in
another state, depends for its validity
upon the laws of the sovereignty in which
it is exercised, and that as the policy of
the state of Pennsylvania was, that lands
there held by corporations without license
from the Commonwealth were subject to
forfeiture by the- Commonwealth, a foreign corporation acquiring title to lands
therein, took them subject to the exercise of such power of forfeiture.
JosIAH H. BssELL.

Chicago.

Supreme Couwt of the United States.
NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COIPANY v. OLGA DE MALUTA FRALOFF.
It is competent for passenger carriers, by specific regulations, distinctly brought
to the knowledge of the passenger, which are reasonable and not inconsistent with

any statute or its duties to the public, to protect itself against liability as insurer
for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value, except upon additional compensation
proportioned to the risk.
As a condition precedent to any contract for the transportation of baggage, the
carrier may require information from the passenger as to its value, and demand
extra compensation for any excess beyond that which the passenger may reasonably
demand to be transported as baggage under the contract to carry the person.
The carrier may be discharged from liability for the full value of the passenger's
baggage, if the latter by any device or artifice, puts off inquiry as to such value,
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wbereby is imposed upon the carrier responsibility beyond what it is bound to asiume
In consideration of the ordinary fare charged for the transportation of the person.
In absence of legislation or special regulations by the carrier, or of conduct by
uie passenger misleading the carrier as to value of baggage, the failure of the passenger, unasked, to disclose the value of his baggage is not, in itself, a fraud upon
the carrier.
To the extent that articles carried by a passenger for his personal use when travelling exceed in quantity and value such as are ordinarily or usually carried by passengers of like station and pursuing like journeys, they are not baggage for which the
carrier, by general law, is responsible as insurer.
Whether a passenger has carried such an excess of baggage is not a pure quesJoa of law for the sole or final determination of the court, but a question of fact
for the jury, under proper guidance as to the law of the case, and its determination
of the facts--no error of law appearing-is not subject to re-examination in this
court.
Section 4281 of Revised Statutes has no reference to the liability of carriers by
land for the baggage of passengers.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
This was an action to recover the value of certain articles of
wearing apparel alleged to have been taken from the trunk of the
defcndant in error, while a passenger upon the cars of the company,
and while the trunk was in its charge for transportation as part of
her baggage.
There was evidence before the jury tending to establish -the following facts:
The defendant in error, a subject of the Czar of Russia, possessing large wealth, and enjoying high social position among her own
people, after travelling in Europe, Asia and Africa, spending some
time in London and Paris, visited America in 1869, for the double
purpose of benefiting her health and seeing this country. She
brought with her to the United States six trunks, of ordinary
travel-worn appearance, containing a large quantity of wearing
apparel, including many elegant, costly dresses, and also rare and
valuable laces, which she had been accustomed to wear upon different dresses, when on visits, or frequenting theatres, or attending
dinners, balls and receptions. A portion of the laces was made by
her ancestors upon their estates in Russia. After remaining some
weeks in the city of New York she started upon a journey westward,
gcing first to Albany, and taking with her, among other things,
two of the trunks brought to this country. After passing a day or
so at Albany, she took passage on the cars of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company for Niagara Falls, deliv-
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ering to the authorized agents of the company for transportation as
her baggage the two trunks above described, which contained the
larger portion of the dress-laces brought with her from Europe.
Upon arriving at Niagara Falls she ascertained that one of the
trunks, during transportation from Albany to the Falls, had been
materially injured, its locks broken, its contents disturbed, fnd more
than two hundred yards of dress-lace abstracted from the trunk in
which it had been carefully placed before she left the city of New
York. The company declined to pay the sum demanded as the
value of the missing laces, and having denied all liability therefor,
this action was instituted to recover the damages which the defendant in error claimed to have sustained by reason of the loss of her
property.
Upon the first trial of the case, in 1873, the jury being unable
to agree, was discharged. A second trial took place in the year
1875. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the company moved a
dismissal of the action, and, at the same time, submitted numerous
instructions which it asked to be then given to the jury, among
which was one peremptorily directing a verdict in its favor. The
court refused to instruct the jury as asked, or otherwise than as
shown in its own charge. To the action of the court the company
excepted. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $10,000.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
would extend this opinion to an improper length,
HARLAN, J.-It
and could serve no useful purpose, were we to enter upon a discussion of the various exceptions, unusual in their number, to the action
of the court in the admission and exclusion of evidence as well as in
refusing to charge the jury as requested by the company. Certain
controlling propositions are presented for our consideration, and
upon their determination the substantial rights of parties seem to
depend. If, in respect to these propositions, no error was committed, the judgment should be affirmed without any reference to
points of a minor and merely technical nature, which do not involve
the merits of the case, or the just rights of parties.
In behalf of the company it is earnestly claimed .that the court
erred in not giving a peremptory instruction for a verdict in its
behalf. This position, however, is wholly untenable. Had there
been no serious controversy about the facts, and had the law upon
the undisputed evidence precluded any recovery whatever against
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the company, such an instruction would have been proper: 1 Wall.
369; 11 How. 872; 19 Id. 269; 22 Wll. 121. The court could
not have given such an instruction in this case without usurping
the functions of the jury. This will, however, more clearly appear
from what is said in the course of this opinion.
The main contention of the company, upon the trial below, was
that good faith required the defendant in error, when delivering her
trunks for transportation, to inform its agents of the peculiar character and extraordinary value of the laces in question ; and that her
failure, in that respect, whether intentional or not, was, in itself, a
fraud upon the carrier which prevented any recovery in this action.
The Circuit Court refused, and, in our opinion, rightly, to so instruct the jury. We are not referred to any legislative enactment
restricting or limiting the responsibility of passenger carriers, by
land, for articles carried as baggage. Nor is it pretended that the
plaintiff in error had, at the date of these transactions, established
or promulgated any regulation as to the quantity or value of baggage which passengers upon its cars might carry, without extra
compensation, under the general contract to carry the person. Further, it is not claimed that any inquiry was made of the defendant in
error, either when the trunks were taken into the custody of the
carrier, or at any time prior to the alleged loss, as to the quantity
or value of their contents. It is undoubtedly competent for a carrier of passengers, by specific regulations, distinctly brought to the
knowledge of the passenger, which are reasonable in their character
and not inconsistent with any statute or its duties to the public, to
protect itself against liability, as insurer, for baggage exceeding a
fixed amount in value, except upon additional compensation, proportioned to the risk. And in order that such regulations may be
practically effective, and the carrier advised of the full extent of its
responsibility, and, consequently, of the degree of precaution necessary upon its part, it may rightfully require, as a condition precedent to any contract for the transportation of baggage, information
from the passenger as to its value; and if the value thus disclosed,
exceeds that which the passenger may reasonably demand to be
transported as baggage without extra compensation, the carrier, at
its option, can make such additional charge as the risk fairly justifies. It is also undoubtedly true that the carrier may be discharged
from liability for the full value of the" passenger's baggage, if the
latter, by false statements, or by any devise or artifice, puts off in-
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quiry, as to such value, whereby is imposed upon the carrier respousibility beyond what it was bound to assume in consideration of the
ordinary fare charged for the transportation of the person. But in
the absence of legislation, limiting the responsibility of carriers for
the baggage of passengers-in the absence of reasonable regulations
upon the subject by the carrier, of which the passenger ha knowledge-in the absence of inquiry of the passenger as to the value
of the articles carried, under the name of baggage, for his personal
use and convenience when travelling-and in the absence-of conduct
upon the part of the passenger misleading the carrier as to the value
of his baggage, the court cannot, as mere matter of law, declare, as
it was in effect requested in this case to do, that the mere failure of
the passenger, unasked, to disclose the value of his baggage, is a
fraud upon the carrier, which defeats all right of recovery. The
instructions asked by the company virtually assumed that the general law, governing the rights, duties and responsibilities .of passenger carriers, prescribed a definite, fixed limit of value, beyond which
the carrier was not liable for baggage, except under a special contract, or upon previous notice as to value. We are not, however4
referred to any adjudged case, or to any elementary treatise which
In the very
sustains that proposition, without qualification.
the courts in
by
nature of things no such rule could be established
virtue of any inherent power they possess. The quantity, or kind,
or value of the baggage which a passenger may carry under the contract for the transportation of his person, depends upon a variety of
circumstances which do not exist in every case. "That which one
traveller," says ERLE, C. J., in Philpot v. Northwestern .R ailway
Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.), 321, "would consider indispensable, would
be deemed superfluous and unnecessary by another. But the general habits and wants of mankind will be taken in the mind of the
carrier when he receives a passenger for conveyance."
Some of the cases seem to announce the broad doctrine that, by
general law, in the absence of legislation, or special regulations by
the carrier, of the character indicated, a passenger may take, without extra compensation, such articles adapted to personal use as hit
necessities, comfort, convenience, or even gratification may suggest;
and that, whatever may be the quantity or value of such articles,
the carrier is responsible for all damages or loss to them, from
whatever source, unless from the act of God or the public enemy.
But that, in our judgment, is not an accurate statement of the law.
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Whether articles of wearing apparel, in any particular case, constitute baggage, as that term is understood in the law, for which
the carrier is responsible as insurer, depends upon the inquiry
whether they are such in quantity and value as passengers under
like circumstances ordinarily or usually carry for personal use when
travelling. "The implied undertaking," says Mr. Angell, "of the
proprietors of stage-coaches, railroads, and steamboats, to carry in
safety the baggage of passengers, is not unlimited and cannot be
extended beyond ordinary baggage, or such baggage as a traveller
usually carries with him for his personal convenience." Angell
on Carriers, § 115. In Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 12 Wall.
275, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice FIELD, said that the
contract to carry the person "only implies an undertaking to transport such a limited quantity of articles as are ordinarily taken by
travellers for their personal use and convenience, such quantity
depending, of course, upon the station of the party, the object and
length of his journey, and many other considerations."
To the
same effect is a decision of the Queen's Bench, in ifacrow v. Great
Western Railway Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 121, where Chief Justice
C0CKBtUN announced the true rule to be "that whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he
belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities, or to
the ultimate purpose of the journey, must be considered as personal
luggage." 2 Parsons on Contr. 199. To the extent, therefore,
that the articles carried by the passenger for his personal use,
exceed in quantity and value such as are ordinarily or usually carried by passengers of like station and pursuing like journeys, they
are not baggage for which the carrier, by general law, is responsible
as insurer. In cases of abuse by the passenger of the privilege
which the law gives him, the carrier secures such exemption from
responsibility, not, however, because the passenger, uninquired of,
failed to disclose the character and value of the articles carried, but
because the articles themselves, in excess of the amount usually or
ordinarily carried, under like circumstances, would not constitute
baggage within the true meaning of the law. The laces in question
confessedly constituted a part of the wearing apparel of the defendant in error. They were adapted to, and exclusively designed for,
personal use, according to her convenience, comfort, or tastes,
during the extended journey upon which she had entered. They
VOL. XX6III.- 6
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were not merchandise, nor is there any evidence that they were
intended for sale or for purposes of business. Whether they wero
such articles in quantity and value as passengers of like station
and under like circumstances ordinalily or usually carry for their
personal use, and to subserve their convenience, gratification, or
comfort while travelling, was not a pure question of law for the
sole or final determination of the court, but a question of fact for
the jury, under proper guidance from the court as to the law
governing such cases. It was for the jury to say to what extent,
if any, the baggage of defendant in error exceeded in quantity and
value that which was usually carried without extra compensation,
and to disallow any claim for such excess.
Upon examining the carefully guarded instructions given to the
jury, we are unable to see that the court below omitted anything
essential to a clear comprehension of the issues, or announced any
principle or doctrine not in harmony with settled law. After submitting to the jury the disputed question as to whether the laces
were, in fact, in the trunk of the defendant in error, when delivered
to the company at Albany for transportation to Niagara Falls, the
court charged the jury, in substance, that every traveller was entitled to provide for the exigencies of his journey in the way of
baggage, was not limited to articles which were absolutely essential,
but could carry such as were usually carried by persons travelling,
for their comfort, convenience and gratification upon such journeys;
that the liability of carriers could not be maintained to the extent
of making them responsible for such unusual articles as the exceptional fancies, habits, or idiosyncracies of some particular individual
may prompt him to carry; that their responsibility, as insurers,
was limited to such articles as it was customary or reasonable for
travellers of the same class in general, to take for such journeys as
the one which was the subject of inquiry, and did not extend to
those which the caprice of a particular traveller might lead that
traveller to take ; that, if the company delivered to the defendant
in error, aside from the laces in question, baggage which had been
carried, and which was sufficient for her as reasonable baggage,
within the rules laid down, she was not entitled to recover; that if
she carried the laces in question for the purpose of having them
safely kept and stored by railroad-companies and hotel keepers, and
not for the purpose of using them, as occasion might require, for
her gratification, comfort, or convenience, the company was not
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liable; that if any portion of the missing articles were reasonable
and proper for her to carry, and all was not, they should allow her
the value of that portion.
Looking at the whole scope and bearing of the charge, and interpreting what was said, as it must necessarily have been understood
both by the court and jury, we do not perceive that any error was committed to the prejudice of the company, or of which it can complain.
No error of law appearing upon the record, this covrt cannot reverse
the judgment because, upon examination of the evidence, we may
be of the opinion that the jury should have returned a verdict for a
less amount. If the jury acted upon a gross mistake of facts, or
were governed by some improper influence or bias, the remedy
therefor rested with the court below under its general power to set
aside the verdict. But that court finding that the verdict was
abundantly sustained by the evidence, and that there was no ground
to suppose that the jury bad not performed their duty impartially
and justly, refused to disturb the verdict, and overruleda motion
for new trial. Whether its action, in that particular, was erroneous
or not, our power is restricted by the Constitution to the determination of the questions of law arising upon the record. Our authority
does not extend to a re-examination of facts which have been tried
by the jury under instructions correctly defining the legal rights
of parties: Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 446; 21 How. 167; Ins.
!o. v. Polsom, 18 Wall. 249.
It is, perhaps, proper to refer to one other point, suggested in
the elaborate brief of counsel for the company. Our attention is
called to section 4281 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that
"if any shipper of platina, gold, gold dust, coins, jewelry, * *
trinkets, * * silk in a manufactured or unmanufactured form,
whether wrought up or not wrought up with any other material,
furs or laces, or any of them, contained in any parcel, package or
bundle, shall lade the same as freight or baggage on any vessel,
without, at the time of such lading, giving to the master, clerk,
agent or owner of such vessel receiving the same, a written notice
of the true character and value thereof, and having the same entered on the bill of lading therefor, the master and owner of such
vessel shall not be liable as carriers thereof in any form or manner;
nor shall any such master or owner be liable for any of such goods
beyond the value and according to the character thereof, so notified
and entered."
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It is sufficient to say that that section has no application whatever to this case. It has reference alone to the liability of carriers
by water, who transport goods and merchandise of the kind designated. It has no reference to carriers by land, and does not assume
to declare or restrict their liability for the baggage of passengers.
The judgment is affirmed.
FIELD, J.-I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case.
I do not think that two hundred and seventy-five yards of lace,
claimed by the owner to be worth $75,000, and found by the jury
to be of the value of $10,000, can, as a matter of law, be properly
considered as baggage of a passenger, for the loss of which the railroad company, in the absence of any special agreement, should be
held liable; and I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice MILLER
and Mr. Justice STRONG concur in this view.
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An adjudication of bankruptcy having been held by the courts of Indiana, to have
the same effect upon the wife's claim to dower as a judicial sale of the husband's
real estate, the federal courts will follow that rule in regard to land in that state.
By the law of Indiana, a wife's inchoate right of dower becomes absolute, upon

the judicial sale of her husband's real estate and she is entitled to immediate possession.
But this rule does not apply to land in which the -husband has only an equitable
title. As to such lands an adjudication of bankruptcy against the husband, passes
his title to the assignee free from any claim of the wife.

Bill to quiet title. On exceptions to master's report.
The plaintiff is the assignee of William F. Noble, a bankrupt.
Rachael Noble, one of the defendants, is the wife of the bankrupt.
Among the assets of the bankrupt that passed to his assignee was a
parcel of real estate that had formerly constituted a portion, of the
common-school lands of the state.
William F. Noble, the bankrupt, held title to it by certificate of
purchase from the officer authorized to sell the school lands. He
nad paid a portion only of the purchase-money, and had received
no deed. His only muniment of title was his certificate of purchase. He had been in possession of the land under his purchase
for many years before his bankruptcy.
In the course of his administration of the bankrupt's estate, the
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ssignee, pursuant to authority of the court, borrowed money upon
security of the land and paid the remainder of the purchase-money.
This suit was brought by the assignee to quiet the title as against
a claim asserted by Rachael Noble to a marital interest in the land.
The 27th section of the Indiana Statute of Descents (18 Davis,
p. 413) is as follows:
"A surviving wife is entitled, except as in sect. 17 excepted, to one-third
of fll the real estate of which her husband may have been seised in feesimple, at any time during the marriage, and in the conveyance of which she
may not have joined in due form of law ; and also of all lands in which her
husband had an equitable interest at the time of his death; provided, that if
the husband shall have left a will the wife may elect to take under the will
instead of this or the foregoing provisions of this act."

The 29th sect. of that statute is as follows:"If the husband shall have made a contract for lands, and at the time of his
decease the consideration, whole or in part, shall not have been paid, but after
his death the same shall be paid out of the proceeds of his estate, his widow
shall have one-third of said lands in the same manner as if the legal estate
had vested in the husband during the coverture."

An act of the state legislature, approved March 11th 1875 (Laws
1875, p. 178), provides that a married woman's inchoate interest in
her husband's lands shall become perfect, and that she shall be
entitled to present possession and enjoyment in certain contingencies. Its first section is as follows:
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Indiana, that in
all cases of judicial sales of real property, in which any married woman has
an inchoate interest by virtue of her marriage, where the inchoate interest is
not directed by the judgment to be sold, or barred by virtue of such sale, such
intereit shall become absolute and vest in the wife in the same manner and to
the same extent as such inchoate interest of married women now becomes
absolute upon the death of the husband, whenever by virtue of said sale the

legal title of the husband in and to such real property bhall become absolute
and vested in the purchaser thereof, his heirs or assigns, subject to the provisions of this act, and not otherwise. That when such inchoate right shall
become vested, under the provisions of this act, such wife shall have the right
to the immediate possession thereof, and may have partition, upon agreement
with the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, or upon demand, without the payment of rent, have the same set-off to her."

Booker & Norton, for plaintiff.
Olaoypool, Newcomb & KYetcham, and Dailey & Pickrell, for
defendant.
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GRESHAM, J.-It
is urged by counsel for Mrs. Noble, that the
adjudication of bankruptcy against her husband, and the transference of her husband's title to his property to his assignee, amount
to a "judicial sale" of his property within the meaning of the Act
of March lth 1875, and that she stands vested with the same
interest in his estate as she would have inherited in the event
'of his death.
The first branch of this proposition is sustained by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the state in Robert8 v. Shroyer,
which is not reported. This being a decision of the highest court
of the state, upon a statute of the state, and upon a question relating to real property, must govern the same question in this court.
I assume, therefore, that Mrs. Noble's right to immediate absolute
ownership and possession of her marital interest in the lands of her
husband is as complete as it would have been had the sale been
made on execution under the judgment of a state court.
But as to the other branch of the proposition, viz., that the interest she takes in such contingency in real estate to which her husband held but an equitable title, is the same that she would inherit
in the event of her husband's death-that is not decided by the case
cited, nor by any other to which my attention has been called.
The Supreme Court of the state has repeatedly held, that a married woman is vested with an inchoate title, during the lifetime of
her husband, to all the real estate of which he was seised in fee
during coverture, that, under the statute, would descend to her at
his death. He cannot, without her concurrence, alienate or suffer
alienation of this inchoate title vested in her.
But as to lands in which he holds but an equitable title only, the
case is different. In such lands she has no inchoate title. The
twenty-seventh section of the descent law above cited shows this,
and the Supreme Court of, the state has repeatedly held, that the
husband without her concurrence may dispose of such equitable title,
and that the purchaser will hold the same clear of any claim of the
wife.
When land owned by the husband in fee is sold upon execution
against him, the wife's vested inchoate right remains intact. That'
cannot be sold on execution against him, for it is not his. He
cannot sell it himself, for it is vested in his wife. The Act of
March 1875 enlarges the wife's rights, in so far that it terminates
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in the contingency provided for the husband's right of survivorship,
and admits her into ownership and possession during his lifetime.
But in respect of land held by the husband by a merely equitable
title, the case is entirely different. In such land the wife has no
vested inchoate interest during his lifetime. While he lives, the
equitable title is his absolutely. He may sell it without consulting
her. His dominion and ownership are absolute. This being the
character of his ownership of an equitable title to land, it nust, of
cours&, be subject, like any other property owned absolutely by
him, to the claims of his creditors.
If, upon creditor's bill, or upon proceedings supplemental to execution, it is subjected to the claims of his creditors during his life
time, he would not, of course, hold "an equitable interest at the
time of his death," within the meaning of section 27 of the descent
law, and his widow would inherit nothing.
As said before, I regard the case of Roberts v. iSroyer as an
authoritative interpretation of the Act of March 1875, irrespective
of any question respecting its original merits. I may add, however, that it accords with my own view of the proper interpretation
of that act.
Conceding, therefore, to that act, as thus interpreted, the greatest
efficacy that can be claimed for it here, we have but the case of a
judicial sale of an equitable title to real estate, made in a husband's
lifetime, to pay his debts, leaving nothing to descend to his wife.
The Act of March 11th 1875, neither by its letter nor spirit gives
the wife an interest in such case. By its terms it applies only to
judicial sales of real estate of the husband, in which the wife "has
an inchoate interest by virtue of her marriage."
The twenty-ninth section of the statute of descents, above cited,
is not applicable here. That section has reference to the settlement
of a decedent's estate and the descent of real property, as between
the widow and the other heirs. It was not intended to establish
the rights of the widow as against creditors.
The casd under consideration is that of a contract for the purchase of real estate where but imrtial payments of purchase-money
have been made, being subjected to sale to satisfy the demands of
creditors.
The exceptions to the Master's report are overruled.

